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ABSTRACT  
The aftermath of September 11, 2001 left our country fighting a battle against
terrorism. While our government has taken steps in protecting our country with the
formation of the Department of Homeland Security, researchers in the field of Sports
Management have begun to examine security preparation and risk management plans at
sporting events. However, little research has examined risk assessment and risk
communication. Securing sport venues starts with an individual analyzing all the
potential risks with hosting an event. How risk is communicated and how risk is
perceived can affect security preparation and risk management plans.
  

The purpose of this study was (1) To discover whether information presented on a

IUHTXHQF\RUSUREDELOLW\VFDOHDIIHFWVDEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
likelihood of a possible terrorist attack. (2) To detect whether information presented on a
IUHTXHQF\RUSUREDELOLW\VFDOHDIIHFWVDEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VVHFXULW\SUHSDUDWLRQ
 7RLGHQWLI\LIWKHPHGLD¶V WHOHYLVLRQUDGLRLQWHUQHWFRQIHUHQFHVPDJD]LQH
v

newspaper, and word of moutK SRUWUD\DORIWHUURULVPLQIOXHQFHVDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶V
perception that an attack is likely to occur.
Three  hundred  and  fifty  facility  managers  at  NCAA  Division  I  universities  and  
colleges in the United States, who were in charge of basketball arena safety, were chosen
as subjects for this study. Questions pertaining to risk communications were presented on
IUHTXHQF\DQGSUREDELOLW\VFDOHVWRVHHLIPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIULVNGLIIHUHG7KH
research also studied whether or not mass media influenced maQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH
likelihood of a terrorist attack and security preparation plans. Data analysis included
descriptive statistics and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). When a significant
difference was found for a research question whose independent variable had three or
more groups, post hoc analysis using the Tukey Honesty Significant Difference (HSD)
was performed to determine a mean difference between groups.
The  results  indicated  that  there  was  a  difference  in  how  facility  managers  
interpreted risk when information was provided on two different scales, i.e., frequency
versus probability. When facility managers were placed in New York, they perceived
greater risk to their facility when risk was presented on a frequency scale versus a
probability scale. Furthermore, facility managers were more likely to monitor Homeland
Security when risk is presented on a frequency scale than on a probability scale, when
placed at a facility in New York. Additionally, when determining at what point, i.e.,
threshold, facility managers would re-evaluate their security preparation plans, facility
managers indicated re-evaluating security plans sooner when risk was communicated on
a frequency scale as opposed to a probability scale.
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CHAPTER  I  -  INTRODUCTION  
On September 11, 2011, Americans awoke with no thought of a terrorist attack, or
a feeling of being targeted, or that they would never return home; and then at 8:46AM
nineteen terrorists crashed four planes, hitting World Trade Tower One and Two, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. It is believed that the plane that crashed in
Pennsylvania was heading towards Washington, D.C. and the White House. According to
CNN (2006), the attacks left 2,973 Americans and foreign nationals (excluding the
terrorists) dead. This catastrophe, and its aftermath, acutely transformed our perceptions
into ones of vulnerability, fear, and alarm. Security increased at major landmarks,
government facilities, airports, water ports, and entertainment venues amid fears that
another attack was imminent.
In 2002 and 2006, the FBI issued warnings that individuals with suspected ties to
terrorist groups had used the internet to access information on stadiums and arenas in the
U.S. and made an online posting discussing an attack against sport venues (Associated
Press, 2002; 2006). In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI issued
security bulletins to raise awareness regarding terrorist interest in attacking sports and
HQWHUWDLQPHQWYHQXHVLQWKH86VWDWLQJ³WHUURULVWJURXSVVXFKDV$O-Qaeda view
FURZGHGVWDGLXPVDQGDUHQDVDVSRWHQWLDOWDUJHWV´ &11 
Several professional sport leagues have taken a pro-active stance in securing their
venues. Major League Baseball (MLB) established minimum security standards for all
ballparks that included guidelines on alcohol sales, bag inspections, and barricades. The
National Football League (NFL) established security restrictions for fans attending Super
Bowl XLIV which included prohibiting camera and binocular cases, subjecting small

1

bags to searches, and subjecting all patrons to metal detectors and pat-down searches
(USA Today, 2010).
Professional sport venues are not the only potential target for terrorist attacks.
Collegiate sports stadiums host thousands of fans each weekend providing a perfect target
for mass casualties and extensive media coverage (Hall, 2006). According to NCAA
attendance records, approximately 32,835,863 people attended collegiate basketball
games during the 2007 season (Official NCAA Basketball Records Book, 2007). With
over 32 million people attending collegiate basketball games each year, it is important
that universities have written risk management plans that include terrorism.
Pantera, Accorsi, Winter, Gobeille, Griveas, Queen, Insalaco, and Domanski
(2003) surveyed Division  I  athletic  directors  and  university  directors  of  public  safety  to  
find  out  their  security  preparations  before  a  football  and  basketball  game.   Using a 38item security check list, the researchers concluded that preparation for basketball games
did not score as high as football games; one area in particular that scored low on the
security preparation list was using bomb sniffing dogs around and inside the area. This
gap in security could indicate that basketball arena managers perceive their facility as a
terrorist target to a lesser extent than football stadium managers, leaving basketball
arenas possibly more vulnerable in the event such an attack takes place. Other areas that
scored low included undercover surveillance and 90  minute  minimum  pre-event  
concession  deliveries  (Pantera et al., 2003).    
  

Finances  may  play  a  role  in  the  discrepancies  in  scores  between  football  stadiums  

and  basketball  arenas.  Hiring  undercover  surveillance  personnel  for  every  home  
basketball  game  would  be  costly,  considering  there  are  between  16-18  home  games  per  
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year  which  is  nearly  double  the  amount  a  football  stadium  will  host.  However,  low  scores  
on  90  minute  minimum  pre-event  delivery  can  pose  a  threat  to  securing  the  venue.  
Securing  the  inner  perimeter  90  minutes  prior  to  the  start  of  a  sporting  event  ensures  that  
all  vehicles  are  swept  for  bombs  or  other  weapons  of  mass  destruction  before  the  talent  
and  fans  arrive.  In March 2005, the Department of Homeland Security stated a truck
bombing at a sports arena by terrorists would lead to a disastrous outcome if the event
should occur (Lipton, 2005; Hall, Marciani, Cooper, & Rolen, 2007).  Consequently,  
delivery  trucks,  vans,  or  even  cars  parked  in  the  arena  or  outside  side  entrances  prior  to  
the  start  of  the  event,  could  conceivably  carry  a  weapon  of  mass  destruction.        
According to the Baker, Connaughton, Zhang, & Spengler (2007) study on the
perceived risk of terrorism and related risk management practices of NCAA Division 1A
football stadium managers, the latter perceive terrorism as a foreseeable threat to their
stadiums. Although stadium managers perceived their facility as a potential terrorist
target, Baker et al. found staff at both the management level and non-management level
lacked proper training. Additionally, Dunn (2010) study on Division I basketball facility
PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWHUURULVPUHYHDOHGVLPLODUILQGLQJV³IRUW\-six percent of
basketball arena managers considered themselves at risk for a terrorist attack and that
WKHUHZHUHHQWLWLHVZLWKLQWKHLUFRPPXQLW\FDSDEOHRISHUIRUPLQJVXFKDFWV´ S 
Furthermore, only forty-two percent of basketball arenas required some type of training
for their staff; however, the majority (29%) only trained their staff once a year (Dunn,
2010). Previous research (Beckerman 2006; Hall, 2006, Cunningham, 2007; Hall,
Marciani, Cooper, & Phillip, n.d.) also identified an industry gap in training and
education of intercollegiate facility managers in event security.
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In addition, football facility managers did not include the Department of
Homeland Security threat level when preparing their security or risk measures (Baker et
DO 7KH'HSDUWPHQWRI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\ '+6 ³RYHrsees and coordinates a
national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism, and respond to any future
DWWDFNV´ %ULHI'RFXPHQWDU\+LVWRU\RIWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\2008, p. 4). Ed Worthington, former director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland
6HFXULW\ZDVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJ³6SRUWLQJHYHQWVDUHSHUIHFWWDUJHWVEHFDXVHRIWKH
number of people amassed in a relatively small space, and in any nation where sports are
held in such high regard, an attack on any scale would likely grab national or even
LQWHUQDWLRQDODWWHQWLRQ´ 'R\OH+DOOHWDO 
The exact timing, location, and targeted victims play a key role when a terrorist
attack is carried out. The masterminds behind the 9/11 attacks chose specific targets that
symbolized cultural and economic importance (Dunn, 2010). The attacks were
orchestrated like a theater production portrayed all over the country and the world by the
media, which left the audience shocked, distressed, stunned, and angered, that such an
attack could happen in the U.S (Shoshani & Slone, 2008). What would happen if a
similar attack took place at a collegiate sporting event or multiple sporting events? News
would quickly spread through the media outlets, current sports broadcasting channels
(ESPN, ESPN2, Fox Sports, etc.), traditional news channels (MSNBC, CNN, Fox News,
HWF DQGORFDOPHGLD 'XQQ 7KH8QLYHUVLW\RI7H[DVDW$XVWLQPHQ¶VEDVNHWEDOO
team plays in the Frank Erwin Center which holds 16,755 spectators, the University of
North &DUROLQDDW&KDSHO+LOOPHQ¶VDQGZRPHQ¶VEDVNHWEDOOWHDPVSOD\DWWKH'HDQ
Smith Center which has seating capacity of 21,750, and Syracuse University's Carrier
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Dome holds 34,616 spectators. If a bomb or a weapon of mass destruction did detonate in
one or all three of the arenas mentioned above during a scheduled home game, within
seconds, images of the aftermath would be broadcast throughout the world via television,
the internet, and cell phones. The names responsible for the attacks and their ideologies
would flash across your television or computer screen, which is the goal of terrorist
groups.
Sports facility managers are called upon to make crucial decisions concerning the
safety of their arenas. Oftentimes, facility managers will pilot likelihood scenarios as a
tool to conduct a risk analysis of their facility. These decision-PDNHUVDUH³WKRXJKWWRUHO\
on both numerical and narrative information to the extent they perceive the information
WREHGLDJQRVWLFDFFXUDWHDQGWUXVWZRUWK\´ 'LHFNPDQQ6ORYLc, & Peters, 2009, p. 1).
For example, a facility manager may be alerted by the Department of Homeland Security
that the threat level for a potential attack on U.S. soil has been raised from yellow
(elevated) to orange (high), signaling a higher risk of a possible terrorist attack.
Depending on how risk information is communicated to an individual, risk assessment
FDQJUHDWO\LQFUHDVHRUGHFUHDVHRQHVSHUFHSWLRQRIULVNDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\DIDFLOLW\¶V
preparedness. According to Heilbrun, Dvoskin, Hart, and McNiel (1999),
³LPSURYHPHQWVLQWKHDFFXUDF\RISUHGLFWLRQVZLOOQRW\LHOGDFRPSDUDEOH
improvement in risk related decision-PDNLQJXQOHVVFRPPXQLFDWLRQLVHIIHFWLYH´ S 
Improper risk communications can render a risk assessment useless if it gives individuals
the wrong impression (Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000).
,Q6ORYLFHWDOVWXGLHGSHRSOH¶VMXGJPHQWVRISUREDELOLW\UHODWLYH
frequency, and risk, with regard to the likelihood of a hospitalized mental patient
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committing an act of violence within six months of being discharged from the facility.
The findings indicated that when clinicians were shown risk expressed on a frequency
VFDOH LH³RXWRI´ ULVNDVVHVVPHQWVFRUHVWHQGHGWREHKLJKHUZKLFKOHGWRD
higher percentage of refusal for discharge. However, when clinicians were shown scores
RIULVNRQDSUREDELOLW\VFDOH LH³´ ULVNDVVHVVPHQWVFRUHVWHQGHGWREHORZHU
which led to a lower percentage of refusal for discharge.
How a facility manager interprets risk information and how risk information is
communicated can be vital when constructing risk management plans, security
preparation, and evacuation plans. Furthermore, how the media presents such information
FRXOGDIIHFWDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI risk, which could potentially affect risk
management plans, security preparation, and evacuation plans. This research will first
examine the Slovic et al., (2000) study on judgments of probability, relative frequency,
and risk, to discover whether information presented on a frequency or probability scale
DIIHFWVDEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDSRVVLEOHWHUURULVW
attack. Second, the study will detect if security preparation differs when risk is expressed
in the form of a frequency scale verses a probability scale. Finally, the study will identify
LIWKHPHGLD¶VSRUWUD\DORIWHUURULVPLQIOXHQFHVDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDWDQ
attack is likely to occur.
Statement of the Problem
The heads of major U.S. intelligence aJHQFLHVWROGDVHQDWHFRPPLWWHHWKDW³QRW
only does Al-Qaeda remain a threat to the United States but that the likelihood of another
attempted terror attack in the United States in the next three to six months is almost
FHUWDLQ´ &11 5HVHDUFKLQWKe area of terrorism and sport management currently
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focuses on effective security measures of protecting a venue; however, little research has
DGGUHVVHGDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VMXGJHPHQWRIULVNDVVHVVPHQWDQGULVNFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
specifically, how much danger is enough danger to trigger a reaction. If training for risk
assessment and analysis is nonexistent for facility managers and/or other personnel,
current risk management plans might be deficient for that facility. Furthermore, studies
that have been completed (Pantera et al, 2003; Beckerman, 2006; Hall, 2006;
Cunningham, 2007; Hall, Marciani, Cooper, & Phillip, n.d.; Baker et al., 2007; Doyle,
2005; Hall et al., 2007; & Dunn 2010) indicated a decrease in readiness of intercollegiate
facility managers with regard to a possible terrorist attack at their facility. This decrease
in readiness could be disastrous if an event should occur.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was (1) To discover whether information presented on a
frequency or probabilit\VFDOHDIIHFWVDEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
likelihood of a possible terrorist attack; (2) To detect whether information presented on a
IUHTXHQF\RUSUREDELOLW\VFDOHDIIHFWVDEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VVHFXULW\SUHSDUDWLRQ
and ( 7RLGHQWLI\LIWKHPHGLD¶V WHOHYLVLRQUDGLRLQWHUQHWFRQIHUHQFHVPDJD]LQH
QHZVSDSHU ZRUGRIPRXWK SRUWUD\DORIWHUURULVPLQIOXHQFHVDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶V
perception that an attack is likely to occur.
Significance of the Study
By surveying facility managers at Division I basketball arenas, we can discover if
IDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIULVNFKDQJHEDVHGRQKRZLQIRUPDWLRQLVH[SUHVVHGWR
them. Sport facility managers must make crucial decisions regarding patron and athlete
safety. The way in which a sport facility manager perceives a risk or threat can
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potentially leave a facility more vulnerable. Information gathered in this study will
inform policy makers and practitioners about factors influencing risk assessment and risk
communication. Such information can lead professionals (in sport management) to
conclude if more training is needed, if weaknesses in security are present, if changes need
to be made regarding risk communications, and if the media has a role in a facility
PDQDJHU¶VWKRXght process in game day security and risk assessment.
Research Questions
1. Does the way in which risk communication is presented (i.e., frequency v. probability)
LQIOXHQFHDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDWHUURULVWDWWDFN"
2. Does the way in which risk communication is presented (i.e., frequency v. probability)
influence security preparation plans?
3. Does the way in which risk communication is presented (i.e., frequency v. probability)
influence how closely facility managers monitor Homeland Security and/or mass
media?
4. 'RHVPDVVPHGLDLQIOXHQFHDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRID
terrorist attack?
5. Does mass media influence security preparation plans?
Limitations
The potential limitations of this study may have been:
1. The population used represented only Division I facility managers in charge of safety
at the basketball arena.
2. 7KHUHVXOWVDUHGHSHQGHQWRQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DELOLW\WRFRPSUHKHQGWKHTXHVWLRQV
being asked.
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Delimitation
The participants were limited to Division I college basketball facility managers,
whose responsibility was to ensure a safe environment during all basketball home games
as well as any other activities that take place in the facility. In some instances,
universities use private security firms to safeguard their facilities instead of in-house
employees. The experience of the individuals and organizational culture could possibly
affect the overall findings from this study. However, facility managers at Division II and
III, as well as other professionals that work in indoor facilities could learn from the
outcomes of this study.
Assumptions
1. The participants of this study understood the questions on the survey instrument.
2. The participants of this study responded to the survey questions truthfully.
3. It is assumed that the facility manager in charge of arena safety completed the survey.   
  
Definition  of  Terms  
Dirty  Bomb³A  mix  of  explosives,  such  as  dynamite,  with  radioactive  powder  or  pellets.  
When  the  dynamite  or  other  explosives  are  set  off,  the  blast  carries  radioactive  material  
LQWRWKHVXUURXQGLQJDUHD´ &HQWHUIRU'LVHDVH&RQWURO   
Hard  Target:  A  place  that  has  significant  security  presence  in  order  to  deter  a  terrorist  
attack  (FBI,  2007).    
Facility  Manager:  One  who  manages  an  area,  structures,  and  fixtures  essential  to  
accommodate  the  program.  One  who  may  carry  out  the  following  duties:  (1)  inspects  the  
premises  to  discover  obvious  and  hidden  hazards;;  (2)  removes  the  hazards  or  warns  of  
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their  presence;;  (3)  anticipates  foreseeable  uses  and  activities  by  invitees  and  takes  
reasonable  precautions  to  protect  the  invitee  from  foreseeable  dangers;;  and  (4)  conducts  
operations  on  the  premises  with  reasonable  care  for  the  safety  of  the  invitee  (Seidler,  
2009).    
Manager: One  who  manages;;  a  person  who  conducts  business  or  household  affairs;;  a  
person  whose  work  or  profession  is  management  (Merriam-Webster,  2010).    
Risk: 7KHFKDQFHRILQMXU\GDPDJHRUORVVGDQJHURXVFKDQFHKD]DUG :HEVWHU¶V 
Risk  Management  Plan: Identifies risk management as controlling the financial and
personal injury losses from sudden, unforeseen, unusual accidents and intentional torts
(Ammon, 1993).
Safety: The  condition  of  being  safe  from  undergoing  or  causing  hurt,  injury,  or  loss  
(Webster,  2010).    
Security: The  quality  or  state  of  being  secure;;  freedom  from  danger;;  freedom  from  fear  or  
anxiety  (Merriam-Webster,  2010).    
Soft  Targets:  Large  public  gatherings  and  symbolic  targets,  such  as  monuments  and  
government  buildings  (FBI,  2007).    
Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)³Weapons  capable  of  inflicting  massive  
destruction  to  property  and/or  population,  using  chemical,  biological  or  radioactive  
PDWHULDO´ $UP\-technology,  2010).    
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Chapter  II  ±  REVIEW  OF  LITERATURE  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the current literature associated with
WHUURULVPDQG1&$$'LYLVLRQ,IDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRILW&KDSWHU,,LV
subdivided into the following areas: (1) Terrorism and Sport; (2) Perception and Risk; (3)
Risk and Communications; (4) Media, Perception, and Terrorism; and (5) Risk
Management Plans.
Terrorism and Sport  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use
of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives"
(FBI, 2010). Terrorists use threats to create fear among the public, convince individuals
that their government is helpless to prevent such actions, and get immediate publicity for
their cauVHV )(0$ 5LFKDUGVRQ  EHOLHYHVWHUURULVWV³ZDQWWRH[DFWUHYHQJH
DFTXLUHJORU\DQGZDQWWRIRUFHWKHLUDGYHUVDU\LQWRDUHDFWLRQ´ 5LFKDUGVRQS
14). There are several types of weapons terrorists use, including explosives, hijacking,
DUVRQVKRRWLQJNLGQDSSLQJDQG1%&¶V± nuclear, biological agents, and chemical
(NESEC, 2005). Responses to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are vastly different
from natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, winter storms, etc). Unlike natural disasters,
there may be little or no forewarning, obvious indicators, or lead time to officials and
citizens (IAAM, 2002).
The events of September 11th caught most Americans by surprise as it was the
first time a terrorist organization carried out an attack on U.S. soil with such mass
destruction; however, terrorist organizations have existed for quite some time. On July  
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22,  1968  an  El  Al  Boeing  707  from  Rome  to  Tel  Aviv  was  hijacked  and  flown  to  Algiers  
E\WKUHHPHPEHUVRIµ3RSXODU)URQWIRUWKH/LEHUDWLRQRI3DOHVWLQH¶ 3)/3 $IWHUILYH
days,  foreigners,  women  and  children  were  freed,  while  twelve  Israeli  men  were  held  for  
39  days  until  exchanged  for  15  Palestinians  in  an  Israeli  jail.  Later  that  year,  in  
December,  two  PFLP  gunmen  fired  on  an  Israeli  plane  parked  at  Athens  airport,  killing  
an  Israeli  mechanic. The PFLP incidents gave the organization an international stage in
ZKLFKWKHZRUOGZLWQHVVHGDWHUURULVW¶VJURXSDEGXFWLRQRIFLYLOLDQVLQDQDWWHPSWWR
achieve various demands from the Israeli government. At the time of the hijacking, PFLP
OHDGHU*HRUJH+DEDVKVWDWHG³:KHQZHKLMDFNDSODQHLWKDVPRUHHIIHFWWKDQLIZH
killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for
nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us
QRZ´ +DOVHOO 
Terrorist-based risk and attacks associated at sporting events is not so far-fetched;
the Taliban had used Ghazi Stadium in Kabul, Afghanistan as a place to carry out public
executions, paintball facilities are used as areas for training, and there has been a total of
168 terrorist related attacks in sport between 1972 and 2004 (Clark, 2004; Kennelly,
2005; Toohey & Taylor, 2008). During the 1972 Olympic Games, members of a
Palestinian group FDOOHGµ%ODFN6HSWHPEHU¶VWRUPHGWKH2O\PSLF9LOODJHDQGWRRN
several Israeli athletes and officials hostage. After a long standoff, a rescue attempt was
made, but in the end all the Israeli athletes died. Egypt, Israel, Algeria, and the
Philippines all withdrew from the Games. After suspending the Games for 24 hours, the
International Olympic Committee resumed competition. In 1996, the Atlanta Games
suffered a different form of terrorism. A bomb exploded in Olympic Centennial Park,
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killing one spectator and a journalist, while hundreds were injured from debris. To date,
the terrorists and/or group have not been brought to justice.
Chemical attacks at basketball arenas are of great concern due to the enclosed
nature of the facility (Piccarello,  2005)  and  their  proximity  to transportation hubs, hotels,
and restaurants which increases the amount of mass destruction an attack can have
(Hadfield, Toohey, Taylor, & Mason, 2004). Ten months after the 9/11 attacks, the FBI
alerted stadium officials that people with suspected ties to terrorist groups had used the
internet to access information on stadiums in the U.S. and Europe (Grace, 2002).
6SRUWLQJHYHQWVDUHFODVVLILHGDVµVRIWWDUJHWV¶WKRVHOHVVJXDUGHGWKDQKLJKULVNWDUJHWV
Soft targets are prone to attacks for several reasons: (1) symbolic; (2) represents
capitalism; (3) difficult to secure because of the number of patrons coming and going; (4)
high number of casualties; (5) patrons highly focused on the game, not their
surroundings; (6) inadequate staff training; and (7) financial losses can be devastating
(Piccarello, 2005; McCann, 2006; Marciani & Hall, 2007).
$IDFLOLW\¶VVHFXULW\RULWVGHJUHHRIVRIWQHVVLVDNH\FRPSRQHQWDVWHUURULVWV
have  determined  that  striking  a  soft  target  means  a  lower  risk  in  the  operation  and  
ultimately  enables  a  better  probability  of  success  (Matthew,  2004;;  Dunn,  2010).  The
Defense Intelligence Agency also stated that terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda, have altered
their focus towards soft targets (Jacoby, 2004). Hall et al., (2007) addressed soft targets
and collegiate facilities, stating collegiate venues are more susceptible than professional
venues because they are less recognizable than professional stadiums, which facilitates a
mindset to minimize the potential threat.
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Perception and Risk
Perception is defined as a process of sensing, holding, recognizing, and making
meaning of sensory information (Brunning, Schraw, Norby, Ronning, 2004). Safety
managers and/or professionals who are in charge of sporting events and/or activities need
the aptitude to perceive and avoid hurtful conditions to survive. One of the driving forces
behind risk perception research is to provide policy makers with the information that they
need to assess risks and develop new risk management strategies (Slovic, 1987; Baker et
al., 2007).
Understanding what we see and how to look depends on the knowledge we have
at our disposal (Brunning, et. al, 2004; McCann, Besner, & Davelaar, 1988). Experts in
the field of facility safety can perceive certain actions of patrons and unaccompanied
objects differently from a person who is not an expert in the field. The expert can
immediately recognize a suspicious person or certain devices that can cause harm to
others. Our existing knowledge allows perception to occur but it also guides new ways of
thinking (Brunning, et. al., 2004).
According to Slovic, Peters, and Finucane (2005), risk is perceived and acted on
LQWZRZD\VULVNDVIHHOLQJVZKLFKUHIHUVWRDSHUVRQ¶VIDVWLQVWLQFWLYHDQGLQWXLWLYH
reactions to danger, and risk as analysis, referring to logic, reason, and scientific
GHOLEHUDWLRQ S ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWµDIIHFW¶SOD\VDNH\UROHLQULVNRIIHHOLQJ
Individuals comprehend risk in two foundational ways, rational and experiential (Slovic,
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004;
(VSWHLQ 6ORYLFHWDO  H[SODLQWKHUDWLRQDOV\VWHPDVD³GHOLEHUDWLYH
analytical system that follows rules of logic, while experiential system encodes reality in
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LPDJHVPHWDSKRUVDQGQDUUDWLYHVWRZKLFKDIIHFWLYHIHHOLQJVKDYHEHFRPHDWWDFKHG´ S
S37). Although using a rational system is important in the decision making process,
reliance on affect and emotion is quicker and a more efficient way to navigate in a
complex and uncertain world (Slovic et al., 2005).
Evidence of risk as feelings has been present in psychometric studies of risk
perception for many years (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). Such
studies have shown that dread was a factor when determining risk (Slovic et al., 2004). If
you think about it, if one has a favorable feeling towards an activity, the perceived risk is
low and the benefits are high; however, if feelings are unfavorable, perceived risk is high
and the benefits are low (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000).
Facility managers need to reach a point at which they feel confident in hosting an
event. They accomplish this through well written risk management plans. By having such
plans, they are reducing the likelihood of a negative incident occurring and if it does
occur, they are reducing the damages that will result from it. A study conducted by
Baker, Connaughton, Zhang, and Spengler (2007) examined Division I football stadium
PDQDJHUV¶perceptions of terrorism. The study revealed that not only did football stadium
managers perceive terrorism as a foreseeable threat (M = 4.26 on a Likert 5 point scale),
but that it was only a matter of time before terrorists attacked a sport facility in the U.S.
(M = 3.70 on a Likert 5 point scale). This perception could be a main reason why the
majority also stated that, after witnessing the events of 9/11, they perceived that their risk
management plans needed to be reevaluated (Baker et al., 2007). Football stadium
managers clearly perceive themselves as targets for terrorism and that they have a feeling
of dread that something bad is likely to occur. Although not directly stated in the study,
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one can assume that their risk of feeling was a precursor to reevaluating their risk
management plans.
'XQQ¶V  H[DPLQDWLRQRI'LYLVLRQ,EDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶
perceptions of terrorism revealed 46% considered their arena a potential target for
terrorism. The nearer arenas were to governmental entities and economic centers, the
more vulnerable facility managers felt their facility was for potential terrorist attacks.
Basketball facility managers as well as football managers perceive themselves as targets
IRUWHUURULVP)DFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶ULVNIHHOLQJVincreased the nearer in proximity their
facility was to governmental organizations and economic centers. However, the Baker et
DO  DQG'XQQ  VWXGLHVGLGQRWUHYHDODWZKDWSRLQWIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶ULVN
feelings were triggered. This study will examine at what point (threshold) this reaction
ULVNIHHOLQJ LVWULJJHUHGDIIHFWLQJIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶ULVNSHUFHSWLRQVVHFXULW\
preparation, and monitoring of Homeland Security and/or mass media.
Risk and Communications
On September 11th, the government was slow to communicate information to
U.S. citizens about the safety of our country. President Bush made his first remarks four
hours after the South Tower of the World Trade Center was hit. Since terrorist acts are
designed to spread fear and panic among the public, it is very important to take steps to
reduce fear and avoid panic through sound communications (Deisler, 2002). Like
government officials, facility managers of sport venues need to have an understanding of
good risk communications. The National Research Council Committee on Risk
Perception and Communication (1989) stated that a message should:
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(1) ³(PSKDVL]HLQIRUPDWLRQUHOHYDQWWRDQ\SUDFWLFDODFWLRQVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVFDQ
take;
(2) Be couched in clear and plain language;
(3) Respect the audience and its concerns; and
(4) Seek strictly to inform the recipient, unless conditions clearly warrant the use
of influencing techniques. Good risk communication practices applied early
and continually, are essential to inform the public accurately of what is
hDSSHQLQJZKDWLVEHLQJGRQHDQGZKDWWKH\FDQGRWKHPVHOYHV´ 'HLVOHU
2002, p. 408).
Having good risk communications allows individuals, like sport venue managers
to make solid decision regarding risk analysis. The Federal Aviation Administration
made the decision to halt all flights in the U.S. fifty-five minutes after American Airlines
flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center. Given the time delay between the crash
and the announcement, government officials probably did not have adequate time to fully
DQDO\]HWKHVLWXDWLRQ,QVWHDGLWPLJKWKDYHEHHQDµJXW¶RUDµULVNRIIHHOLQJ¶GHFLVLRQ
made at the time aimed at ensuring the safety of travelers and flight crews (Deisler,
2002). Sporting events were also canceled on 9/11, the National Football League
postponed its scheduled games on Sunday and Monday of that week, while Major League
Baseball postponed their games until September 16th.
The U.S. Government faces a daunting task of obtaining and interpreting different
types of signals of impending terrorist attacks and reacting effectively to such
information; however, one of the main challenges is the fusion of different types of
information from different sources (i.e., human intelligence, electronic signal, etc.)
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(Cornell, 2002). According to Cornell (2002) fusion requires internal communications creating databases and ensuring different intelligence agencies communicate effectively
and provide accurate information in a timely manner - and merging the content
information into useful information. Experts who are in charge of gathering such content,
thus generating a risk assessment or a vulnerability analysis, often use statistical methods
of probability (Whitworth, 2006; Kalt, 2003; Cornell, 2002; General Services
Administration, 2000).
Each potential threat is identified and analyzed in terms of probability and impact;
probability is assigned based on past history for the foreseeable future (Whitworth, 2006;
Kalt, 2003; Cornell, 2002). It is felt as time goes on, the probability of something
occurring increases. Dunn (2010) and Baker et al., (2007) studies revealed over time,
NCAA Division I facility managers felt their football stadiums and basketball arenas
were still targets for a potential terrorist attack.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (n.d.) provides a risk analysis chart
that identifies possible hazards and emergencies. Each possible hazard and emergency is
assessed using a risk rate scale of none, low, moderate, or high. Kalt (2003) analyzed
potential risk threats through a mapping grid. The grid is divided into four quadrants: low
probability-low impact, high probability-low impact, low probability-high impact, and
high probability-high impact. The Business Impact Analysis (BIA) is also used to
identify and assess risk and effects on a business (Berman, 2004; Cerullo & Cerullo,
2004; Kalt, 2003). The BIA process includes: (1) identifying critical business functions,
(2) identifying risks to critical functions, (3) rating and prioritizing risk by probability of
occurrence and impact, (4) identifying ways to avoid or mitigate identified risks, and (5)
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prioritizing avoidance and mitigating options (Cerullo & Cerullo, 2004; Kalt, 2003;
Glenn, 2002).
The Department of Homeland Security issues an advisory system regarding the risk
of a potential terrorist attack in  the  form  of  probability  of  an  attack  occurring  and  its  
potential  gravity.  The  system  consists  of  a  five  color  indicator:  (1)  Green  -  low  risk,  (2)  
Blue  -  guarded  risk,  (3)  Yellow  -  elevated,  (4)  Orange  -  high,  and  (5)  Red  -  severe.    
  

None  of  the  methods  mentioned  above  communicate  risk  in  the  form  of  frequency.  

Dunn  (2010)  and  Baker  et  al.,  (2007)  studies  revealed  the  majority  of  facility  managers  
do  not  change  their  security  methods  based  on  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  
threat  indicator;;  however,  if  the  risk  of  a  potential  threat  was  expressed  in  the  form  of  
IUHTXHQF\LQVWHDGRISUREDELOLW\ZRXOGIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIDSRVVLEOH
terrorist  attack  change?    
  

As you recall, in experiential systems, individuals encode reality in images,

metaphors, and narratives. Denes-Raj and Esptein (1994) studied experiential system
encoding, showing that when offered a chance to win one dollar by drawing a red jelly
bean from a bowl, individuals often chose from a bowl that contained a greater absolute
number (of beans) but a smaller proportion of red beans; than from a bowl with fewer red
beans, but a better probability of winning (Slovic et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic
et al., 2005). Individuals felt they had a better chance of winning when there were more
red beans, even though they knew the probability was against them. Subjects in the
Denes-Raj and Esptein (1994) study followed what is known as mental strategy of
imaging the numerator (the red beans) and not thinking about the denominator (number
of beans in the bowl) (Slovic et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2005).
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Slovic et al. (2000) further examined an experiential study at a clinical level,
when psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to judge the likelihood that a mental
patient would commit an act of violence within six months after being discharged. The
UHVXOWVLQGLFDWHGWKDWFOLQLFLDQVZKRZHUHJLYHQDQRWKHUH[SHUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIDSDWLHQW V
risk of violence framed in terms of UHODWLYHIUHTXHQF\ LH³RIHYHU\SDWLHQWVVLPLODU
WR0U-RQHVDUHHVWLPDWHGWRFRPPLWDQDFWRIYLROHQFHWRRWKHUV´ ODEHOHG0U-RQHV
as more dangerous than did clinicians who were shown a statistically equivalent risk
expression as a probabilLW\ LH³3DWLHQWVVLPLODUWR0U-RQHVDUHHVWLPDWHGWRKDYHD
10% chance of committing an act of violence (Slovic et al., 2000). Furthermore, when
FOLQLFLDQVZHUHWROGWKDW³RXWRISDWLHQWVVLPLODUWR0U-RQHVDUHHVWLPDWHGWR
commit an act of vLROHQFH´ZRXOGUHIXVHWRGLVFKDUJHWKHSDWLHQWV 6ORYLFHWDO
2000). Slovic et al., (2000) attributed the different reactions to probability and frequency
to frightening images evoked by the frequency format. Yamagishi (1997) found similar
results when individuals rated a disease that kills 1,286 people out of every 10,000 as
more dangerous than one that kills 24.14% of the population.
$OWKRXJKUHVHDUFKLQWKHDUHDRIDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWHUURULVPLV
starting to be published in journals, nothing has been done concerning probability and
frequency with regard to risk in the field of sports management. This research will
H[DPLQHLI1&$$'LYLVLRQ,EDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIDOLNHO\WHUURULVW
attack differ based on information given on a frequency scale compared to a probability
scale and whether security preparation differs when risk is expressed in the form of
frequency verses probability.
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Media, Perception, and Terrorism
As mentioned earlier, sport facility managers evaluate risk at their facilities daily.
Decisions need to be made on a variety of items, including, routine and preventive
maintenance, staffing, security, deliveries, etc; how a manager analyzes and feels about
the risk could have an affect on the facility and those inside. Tversky and Kahneman
(1973) have argued that people judge the probability or frequency of an event by the ease
with which relevant instances can be retrieved from memory or imagined (Lichtenstein,
Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). This concept seems to suggest that one¶V
judgments will be influenced not only by direct experience but also indirect exposure
through television, internet, newspaper, magazines, movies, and books. Therefore, it is
plausible to think that if a sport facility manager had experienced, witnessed or heard of a
negative incident (fire, crowd control issues, gun shots, etc.), he or she would rate the
probability or frequency of a possible terrorist attack higher than others.
It was also mentioned earlier that terrorists chose their targets and timing of
attacks wisely so the aftermath leaves a burning impression not only on their victims but
the world. The invention of television and the internet has changed the way people view
the world. Images of events can be broadcasted in real-time (as it happens) or within
VHFRQGVWRDXGLHQFHVDURXQGWKHZRUOG7KLVµZRUOGVWDJH¶LVH[DFWO\ZKDWWHUURULVWJURXSV
want, to be able to project their cause for all to see in hopes of either gaining support or
instilling IHDU7KLVLVZKDW6KRVKDQLDQG6ORQH  FDOOµSV\FKRORJLFDOZDUIDUH¶
$FFRUGLQJWR6FKOHLIHU  ³SV\FKRORJLFDOZDUIDUHVHHNVWRSURPRWHVSHFLILFPLOLWDU\
and political goals during wartime. . . by targeting three key audiences²domestic,
enemy, and neutral²H[SRVLQJWKHPWRDYDULHW\RIFUDIWHGPHVVDJHV´ S ³7KH
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nature and intensity of psychological warfare has been facilitated by the rapid
GHYHORSPHQWVRFFXUULQJLQPHGLDWHFKQRORJ\´ S ,QGXULQJWKHKHLJKWRIWKH
Palestinian Intifada, 30,000 Israelis were referred to public and private mental health
clinics throughout the country after becoming a victim or secondary victim (indirectly) to
the exposure of terrorism (Shoshani & Slone, 2008).
Psychological warfare can leave individuals with both long-term and short-term
symptoms including anxiety, fear, phobias and post-traumatic stress disorders (Shoshani
& Slone, 2008). Ofman, Mastria, and Steinberg (1995) conducted a study after the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center. Findings indicted an increase in psychological posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in individuals remotely viewing the event on television.
Studies conducted after 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and the September 11 attacks
have indicted a link between viewing television coverage of disasters and PTSD as well
as short term effects like anxiety, shock, fear, and phobias (Shoshani & Slone, 2008;
Gurwitch, Sitterle, Young, & Pfefferbaum, 2002; Ahern, Galea, Resnick, Kilpatrick,
Bucuvalas, Gold, & Vlahov, 2002; Schuster, Stein, Jaycox, Collins, Marshall, Ellott,
Zhou, Kanouse, Morrison, & Berry, 2001).
Risk Management Plans
Every facility should have written risk management plans that are unique to its
surrounding environment, activity, staff, size of facility, facility polices and procedures,
government agencies, government regulations, and community expectations (IAAM,
2002). Furthermore, such facility plans should be examined by the local law enforcement
authority (i.e. police, fire, and FBI, etc.). Ammon (1993) identifies risk management as
controlling the financial and personal injury losses from sudden, unforeseen, unusual
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DFFLGHQWVDQGLQWHQWLRQDOWRUWV$OWKRXJKWKH1&$$KDVLVVXHGDµ6HFXULW\3ODQQLQJ
2SWLRQV¶GRFXPHQWWRDVVLVWLQVWLWXWLRQVLQWKHLUSODQQLQg for sport events, to date, no
sport event security standards exist for U.S. colleges (Hall et al., n.d.). According to
Clement (2004) a risk management plan consists of three main parts: (1) identification,
(2) evaluation, and (3) control of risks.
Identifying all areas of potential risk is the first step in establishing a risk
management plan. Basketball facility managers have multiple areas which can pose a risk
to them including: the facility, staff, current facility policies and procedures, local, state,
and federal regulations, equipment, supervision, instruction, and outside contractors
&OHPHQW 'XQQ  VWXGLHG'LYLVLRQ,EDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶
perceptions of a possible terrorist attack at their facility. Results showed 46% felt that
their arenas were a potential target for a terrorist attack and that individuals within their
community could carry out such plans. Today, especially after the events of 9/11, sport
facility managers should consider themselves as vulnerable a target as professional sport
facilities, transportation hubs, federal buildings, public utilities, and iconic buildings.
Once the risk is identified, the second step in a risk management plan is to
evaluate it. Risk should be evaluated based on the probability, severity, and magnitude to
determine the amount of risk that exists (Clement, 2004). Several scenarios can run
WKURXJKDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VPLQG  WKHSUREDELOLW\RIVRPHWKLQJRFFXUULQJFRXOGEH
high; however, if something did occur, few people could be injured; (2) the probability of
something occurring could be low; however, if something did occur few people could be
injured; and (3) the probability of something occurring could be low; however, if
something did occur, many people could be injured (Clement, 2004). Keep in mind, one
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death at a facility could lead to financial hardship or bad public relations for the
organization (Clement, 2004). Based on hypothetical situations, this research attempts to
discover how facility managers analyze (evaluate) risk assessment and risk
communication.
The third and final step in a risk management plan is control of the risk. There are
four components to controlling risk: (1) accepting the risk and assuming the
responsibility, (2) retaining the activity and transferring the risk through contracts or
insurance, (3) altering the activity to reduce the risk, and (4) eliminating the activity
(Clement, 2004). Each time an event takes place, facility managers are accepting the risk
that comes with hosting the event. However, certain measures and/or precautions are
taken to not only make the event as safe as possible for patrons and athletes, but for the
facility itself. Such measures include security management, emergency action plans, and
continuing personnel education. Furthermore, facilities often protect themselves through
outsourcing personnel and obtaining insurance. Hall, Marciani, Cooper, and Philips,
(n.d.) studied the needs, concerns, and future challenges in security management of
NCAA Division I football events. The facility managers surveyed in the study were key
personnel responsible for security management at the football events. One interesting
finding of the study revealed that 61% of game day staff (security, fire, and medical
personnel) were outsourced.
Currently, there are several avenues where facility managers in charge of security
preparation can obtain information regarding risk management. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) offers free certificate programs in emergency management
and incident response through an online educational program (http://training.fema.gov/).
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Threat assessment training is available through Texas Engineering Extension Service
(http://www.teex.com/). The international Association of Assembly managers (IAAM)
SURYLGHVDJXLGHIRUHPHUJHQF\SODQQLQJLQWKHLUµ%HVW3UDFWLFHV3ODQQLQJ*XLGH
(PHUJHQF\3UHSDUHGQHVV¶PDQXDOWRKHOSIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUVHVWDEOLVKSODQV
(http://www.iaam.org). Finally, managers can receive security training through a program
GHYHORSHGE\WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\FDOOHGµ/HVVRQV/HDUQHG¶
(http://www.llis.gov).
New Developments
January, 2011, the Obama administration decided to eliminate the Homeland  
Security  Advisory  System  that  has  been  in  place  since  2002.  According  to  the  
'HSDUWPHQWRI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\¶VZHEVLWH³WKH1DWLRQDO7HUURULVP$GYLVRU\6\VWHP
or  NTAS,  will  include  information  specific  to  the  particular  credible  threat,  and  will  not  
use  a  color-coded  scale.  .  .  the  advisory  will  clearly  indicate  whether  the  threat  is  
Elevated,  if  we  have  no  specific  information  about  the  timing  or  location,  or  Imminent,  if  
we  believe  the  WKUHDWLVLPSHQGLQJRUYHU\VRRQ´ '+6 )XUWKHUPRUH³WKH
Personal  Localized  Alerting  Network  or  "PLAN,"  is  scheduled  to  be  available  in  New  
<RUNE\WKHHQGRIWKLV\HDUDQGWKURXJKRXWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVE\$SULO´ $)3
2011).
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CHAPTER  III - METHODS
In order to obtain the data for this study, the use of human subjects was necessary.
This required the review and approval of the University of New Mexico (UNM) human
subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB). The research protocol, instrument, informed
consent, and departmental approval were submitted to the UNM IRB. That approval was
granted.
Formulation of Survey
The survey was developed based on studies by 6ORYLFHWDO  µViolence  Risk  
Assessment  and  Risk  Communication:  The  Effects  of  Using  Actual  Cases,  Providing  
,QVWUXFWLRQDQG(PSOR\LQJ3UREDELOLW\9HUVHV)UHTXHQF\)RUPDWV¶Baker et al., (2007)  
µ3HUFHLYHG5LVNDQG5HODWHG5LVNPDQDJHPHQW3UDFWLFHVRI1&$$'LYLVLRQ,)RRWEDOO
6WDGLXP0DQDJHUV¶and information garnered by the researcher, after conducting a
literature review and discussing risk assessment and risk communication with
professionals in the field of Sport Management.
The survey (see Appendix B) was divided into three parts: (I) directions for the
survey, demographics, and six questions related to media and risk; (II) contained ten risk
conditions; and (III) definitions of risk, weapons of mass destruction, frequency,
probability, and mass media and four hypothetical cases that involved risk/frequency and
risk/probability.
Section (I) of the survey contained six questions that dealt with mass media and
risk management. Respondents were provided a five point Likert-type scale; answers
included strongly  disagree,  disagree,  no  opinion,  agree,  and  strongly  agree.  
Demographic information on each respondent was collected in the following areas: (1)

26

highest level of education, (2) years worked in facility management, (3) years in current
position, and (4) area of the country they currently worked. A map (see appendix B) was
provided to all respondents to help determine the area in which they worked.
  

Section (II) contained ten risk conditions. Respondents were given five risk

conditions expressed as frequency and five risk conditions expressed as probability.
Based on the risk communicated, respondents were asked to determine the following: (1)
how high the risk was for a potential terrorist attack, (2) how closely would they monitor
Homeland Security and/or mass media, and (3) how likely they were to re-evaluate their
security preparation.
  

Section (III) contained two hypothetical cases expressed twice, first in the form of

frequency and then in the form of probability. Cases were constructed from the following
polychotomous cues: (a) area location, (b) size of arena, (c) size of city, (d) Homeland
Security threat level, and (d) terrorist-like activity. Each cue was broken down into the
following areas:
a. Arena location - divided into six sections based on a United States map:
northeast, southeast, northwest, southwest, midwest, and west.
b. Size of Arena - arena size was calculated by going to the 32 Division I
basketball conference websites and finding the average attendance during the
2009 season. The arena break down: small size (5,000), medium (10,000), large
(15,000 plus).
c. Size of City - 2010 census reports were used.
d. Homeland Security - based on the homeland security table - severe (red), high
(orange) & elevated (yellow). Guarded (blue) and low (green) were eliminated
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based on the fact that the Department of Homeland Security has never used
them.
e. Terrorist-Like Activity - included bomb threats, explosions, and distance from
airports and federal buildings.
These cues are believed to be related to how facility managers perceive a threat
based on the current research being conducted elsewhere as well as the pilot study. After
each case, respondents were asked to make four judgments:
 What is the probability (or relative frequency) that a terrorist attack is likely to
occur at the facility within the next three months?  
  A judgment about whether the threat presented a high risk, medium risk, or low
risk to the facility?  
  A judgment about the need to monitor the Department of Homeland Security
Threat Level and/or mass media?  
  An assessment of the likely need to re-evaluate the faciOLW\¶VVHFXULW\
preparation.
In order to establish content validity and construct validity for this instrument,
three pilot studies were coPSOHWHG&RQWHQWYDOLGLW\LV³the degree to which elements of
an assessment instrument are relevant to and representative of the targeted construct for a
SDUWLFXODUDVVHVVPHQWSXUSRVH´ +D\QHV5LFKDUG .XEDQ\S 
A pilot study was conducted with doctoral students with a specialty in risk
management in the Sports Administration program at the University of New Mexico,
facility managers in charge of security at the basketball arena at the University of New
Mexico, and scholars in the field of sports management, who specialize in risk
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management. All groups reviewed the survey and judged the essentialness of each
SDUWLFXODULWHP8VLQJ/DZVKH¶V  VWXG\RIFRQWHQWYDOLGLW\H[SHUWVZHUHDVNHGWR
UDWHWKHLWHPVEDVHGRQWKUHHFDWHJRULHV³HVVHQWLDO´³XVHIXOEXWQRWHVVHQWLDO´RU³QRW
QHFHVVDU\´/DZVKH  FRQWHQWYDOLGLW\UDWLR &95  QH- N2)/(N2)) was used to
calculate the minimum value needed to establish validity. Based on a panel of ten experts,
.62 was needed.
7RDIILUPFRQVWUXFWYDOLGLW\³WKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKDQDVVHVVPHQWLQVWUXPHQW
PHDVXUHVWKHWDUJHWHGFRQWHQW´ +D\QHV5LFKDUG .Xbany, 1995, p. 239) three
professors in the Sports Management Program at the University of New Mexico reviewed
the questions. The panel was asked to judge the survey questions based on the following
criteria:   
a. Are the questions in the survey easy to understand?
b. Do the questions in the survey use appropriate terminology?
c. Do you feel there are any questions that need to be asked that are not included in
the survey?
d. Do you feel there are any questions that are inappropriate?
e. Do you feel any questions contain material that is too sensitive?
The data was analyzed utilizing descriptive statistics. The following adjustments to
the instrument were made:
(1) Homeland Security threat level was eliminated.
(2) Two  locations  were  chosen,  New  York  and  California,  other arena locations were
eliminated.
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(3) Two specific university arenas were chosen and their exact seating capacity were
used.
(4) Miscellaneous section was added - included tailgating activities at the arena,
whether the game was going to be televised, if a rivalry existed between the two
opponents, tickets sold, and campus police assessment.
Reliability is the degree to which a test consistently measures whatever it
PHDVXUHV *D\0LOOV $LUDVLDQ 7RHQVXUHVXUYH\UHOLDELOLW\&URQEDFK¶VDOSKD
was used to estimate internal consistency on how many items on the survey relate to all
other items and to the total test (Gay, Mills & Airasian, 2009).
Participants
The survey was sent to 350 facility managers at NCAA Division I universities and
colleges in the United States, who were in charge of the safety at the basketball arena.
Universities and college names were taken from the NCAA website. Contact information
ZDVFROOHFWHGE\JRLQJWRHDFKLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VDWKOHWLFGHSDUWPHQWZHEVLWHFOLFNLQJRQWKH
staff directory, and searching for an individual to contact regarding the facility
management of the basketball arena. If a facility manager was not listed, an event
manager or operations manager was used. Emails were sent to each institution to
determine if the individual contact was the person in charge of safety at the basketball
arena.
Procedures  
After obtaining IRB approval, the final version of the survey (see Appendix B),
along with a cover letter (see Appendix A) were uploaded to Opinio, an internet based
company that assists individuals with an on-line survey. The internet was used instead of
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traditional mail in/back forms because research has shown that on-line surveys yield a
significantly higher response rate (Cobanoglu, Warde, & Moreo, 2001) and it allowed
participants to remain anonymous to the researcher. Opinio sent out an initial email to all
facility managers with a direct link to the survey. Since follow-up emails have the
potential to increase response rates in web-based surveys by half (Kittleson, 1997),
Opinio was instructed to send out emails once a week for four weeks to all contacts who
had not yet completed the survey.   
Data Analysis  
Data were collected during April 13 - May 10, 2011 and then transferred from
Opinio to SPSS version 17.0 for analysis. All analyses were made with a pre-set alpha
level of .05. Data analysis included descriptive statistics and a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). When a significant difference was found for a research question
whose independent variable had three or more groups, post hoc analysis using the Tukey
Honesty Significant Difference (HSD) was performed to determine a mean difference
between groups.
For the analysis of research questions one, two, and three, a one-way ANOVA
was conducted for testing the significant difference between means. A one-way ANOVA
was used to see how the variables of frequency and probability, used as independent
variables, influenced perception of the likelihood of a terrorist attack, risk perception,
monitoring Homeland Security and/or mass media, and security preparation plans, used
as the dependent variables.
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)RUWKHDQDO\VLVRIUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQIRXU ³'RHVPDVVPHGLDLQIOXHQFHDIDFLOLW\
PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDWHUURULVWDWWDFN"´ GHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVtics were
utilized from questions one, three, and five in section (I) of the survey.
)RUWKHDQDO\VLVRIUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQILYH ³'RHVPDVVPHGLDLQIOXHQFHVHFXULW\
SUHSDUDWLRQSODQV"´ GHVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVZHUHXWLOL]HGIURPTXHVWLRQVWZRIRXUDQd six
in section (I) of the survey.
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Chapter  IV  -  Results  
  
An attempt was made to include the entire population (350) of active facility

managers in charge of security at NCAA Division I basketball arenas. However, six
emails were returned and three individuals wished to be excluded from the survey. A
total of 341 survey invitations went out to facility managers; 76 were returned completed.
This resulted in a response rate of 22.3%.
Demographics
The first part of the survey gathered demographic information about the subjects.
2IWKHIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUVWKDWFRPSOHWHGWKHVXUYH\  SRVVHVVDPDVWHU¶V
GHJUHH  SRVVHVVDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHWKUHH  SRVVHVVDGRFWRUDO
degree, one (1.32%) possesses a high school diploma, and one (1.32%) did not respond.
In terms of experience, 41 (53.95%) have worked nine or more years in the field.
Additionally, sixteen (21.05%) have worked between six to eight years, fifteen (19.74%)
three to five years, three (3.95%) did not answer, and one (1.32%) zero to two years.
When looking at how long subjects have been working in their current position, 25
(32.89%) have worked between three to five years, 22 (28.95%) have worked nine or
more years, 18 (23.68%) six to eight years, nine (11.84%) zero to two years, and two
(2.63%) did not respond. Finally, with regard to which region respondents work in, 20
(26.32%) worked in the northeast, 19 (25%) southeast, 13 (17.11%) midwest, 13
(17.11%) in the southwest, ten (13.16%) in the west, and one (1.32%) chose not to
respond.
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Risk Communication Results - Research Questions one, two and three
Section two and three of the survey instrument dealt with how risk communication
was presented, i.e., frequency versus probability. The study examined if a facility
PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDSRWHQWLDOWHUURULVWDWWDFNLQIOXHQFHGWKHLU
judgments on the level of risk for the facility, how closely one monitors Homeland
Security and/or mass media, and security preparation plans, by the way risk
communication was presented (e.g. frequency vs. probability scale). Each respondent was
provided with two hypothetical cases, in which risk was first communicated in frequency
and then in probability.
5HVHDUFKTXHVWLRQRQH ³Does the way in which risk communication is presented
LHIUHTXHQF\YHUVXVSUREDELOLW\ LQIOXHQFHDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
OLNHOLKRRGRIDWHUURULVWDWWDFN"´ XWLOL]HGDQ$129$&DVHRQHSODFHGWKHIDFLOLW\
manager in charge of security at a Rutgers University versus 6DLQW-RKQ¶V0HQ¶V
basketball game located in Queens, New York. When asked the  frequency  (e.g.,  10  out  of  
100)  of  a  potential  terrorist  attack  occurring  at  this  facility  within  the  next  three  months,  
the  majority,  15  (19.74%)  felt  there  was  a  50  out  of  100  chance. Additionally, 57 (M =
40.88) of the respondents felt the arena was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack,
while 13 (M = 12.31) felt the arena was at medium risk and six (M  = 5.83) felt it was at
low risk. A one way ANOVA indicated a significant difference between the means. Table
1 shows the results of the one way ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated
significant difference between high risk and low (ǻ = 35.044) and high risk and medium
(ǻ = 28.570) at the 0.05 level.
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________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-1
Potential  Terrorist  Attack  -  Case  one  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
13527.454
2
6763.727
14.780
.000
Within Groups
33407.743
73
457.640
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
  

Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when
asked the  probability  of  a  potential  terrorist  attack  occurring  at  this  facility  within  the  
next  three  months,  the  majority,  17  (22.37%)  felt  there  was  a  50%  chance.  Additionally,  
58 (M = 38.45) felt the arena was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack, 13 (M =
22.69) felt it was at medium risk, and five (M = 26.00) felt it was at low risk. A one way
ANOVA did not indicate significant difference between the means [F (2,73) = 2.819, p <
.05].
Overall, results indicated that facility managers perceived risk differently when risk
was communicated on a frequency scale as opposed to a probability scale.
Case two placed the facility manager in charge of security at a Stanford versus
UCLA basketball game located in Los Angeles, California. When asked the  frequency  
(e.g.,  10  out  of  100)  of  a  potential  terrorist  attack  occurring  at  this  facility  within  the  next  
three  months,  the  majority,  20  (15.79%)  felt  there  was  a  20  out  of  100  chance.  
Additionally,  52 (M = 40.48) felt the arena was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack,
while 18 (M = 18.61) said it was at medium risk and six (M = 11.67) felt it was at low
risk. A one way ANOVA indicated significant difference between the means. Table 1-1
shows the results of the one way ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant
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difference between high and low risk (ǻ = 28.814) and high risk and medium risk (ǻ =
21.870) at the .05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-2
Potential  Terrorist  Attack  -  Case  two  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
9367.355
2
4683.678
8.476
.000
Within Groups
40336.592
73
552.556
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
  
  

Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when

asked the  probability  of  a  potential  terrorist  attack  occurring  at  this  facility  within  the  
next  three  months,  the  majority,  12  (15.79%)  felt  there  was  a  ten  percent  chance.
Additionally, 49 (M = 38.47) felt the arena was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack,
17 (M = 18.82) medium risk, and 10 (M = 7.50) low risk. A one way ANOVA indicated
significant difference between the means. Table 1-2 shows the results of the one way
ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference between high risk and
low (ǻ = 30.969) and high risk and medium (ǻ = 19.646) at the .05 level.
2YHUDOOUHVXOWVLQGLFDWHGIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVYDULHGRQERWKWKH
frequency scale and probability scale; therefore, there was no difference in how risk was
communicated.
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________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-3
Potential  Terrorist  Attack  -  Case  two  Probability  
_______________________________________________________________________  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
10700.825
2
5350.413
10.416
.000
Within Groups
37499.175
73
513.687
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
5HVHDUFKTXHVWLRQWZR ³Does the way in which risk communication is presented
LHIUHTXHQF\YHUVXVSUREDELOLW\ LQIOXHQFHVHFXULW\SUHSDUDWLRQSODQV"´ XWLOL]HGDQ
ANOVA. Case one, when asked on a frequency scale how likely they were to re-evaluate
their security plans, 62 (M = 38.15) responded very likely, 10 (M = 14.00) somewhat
likely, and four (5.00) responded unlikely. A one way ANOVA indicated significant
difference between the means. Table 2 shows the results of the one way ANOVA. A
follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference between very likely and unlikely
(ǻ = 33.145) and very likely and somewhat likely (ǻ = 24.145) at the 0.05 level.
________________________________________________________________
Table 4-4
Security  Preparation  Plans  -  Case  one  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
8383.504
2
4191.752
7.937
.001
Within Groups
38551.694
73
528.105
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
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Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when
asked whether they would re-evaluate their security preparation, 63 (M = 38.17) said very
likely, eight (M = 26.25) said somewhat likely, and five (M = 8.00) said unlikely. A one
way ANOVA indicated significant difference between the means. Table 2-1 shows the
results of the one way ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference
between very likely and unlikely (ǻ  at the 0.05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-5
Security  Preparation  Plans  -  Case  one  Probability  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
4892.092
2
2446.046
4.720
.012
Within Groups
37832.579
73
518.255
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
  

  

Overall, facility managers perceptions varied on both the frequency and probability

scales; therefore, there was no difference in how risk was communicated.   
  

Case two, when asked on a frequency scale how likely they were to re-evaluate

their security plans, 57 (M = 39.56) responded very likely, 12 (M = 15.83) somewhat
likely, and seven (M = 9.29) unlikely. A one way ANOVA indicated significant
difference between the means. Table 2-2 shows the results of the one way ANOVA. A
follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference between very likely and unlikely
(ǻ = 30.276) and very likely and somewhat likely (ǻ = 23.728) at the .05 level.
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________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-6
Security  Preparation  Plans  -  Case  two  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
9926.817
2
4963.409
9.109
.000
Within Groups
39777.130
73
544.892
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
  
  
Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when
asked how likely they were to re-evaluate their security plans, 55 (M = 35.91) responded
very likely, 13 (M = 18.46) somewhat likely, and eight (M = 8.13) unlikely. A one way
ANOVA indicated significant difference between the means. Table 2-3 shows the results
of the one way ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference
between very likely and unlikely (ǻ = 27.784) and very likely and somewhat likely (ǻ =
17.448) at the .05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-7
Security  Preparation  Plans  -  Case  two  Probability  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
7479.349
2
3739.674
6.704
.002
Within Groups
40720.651
73
557.817
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05  
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Overall, facility managers perceptions varies on both the frequency and probability

scales; therefore, there was no difference in how risk was communicated.
5HVHDUFKTXHVWLRQWKUHH ³Does the way in which risk communication is presented
(i.e., frequency versus probability) influence how closely facility managers monitor
+RPHODQG6HFXULW\DQGRUPDVVPHGLD"´ XWLOL]HGDQ$129$&DVHRQHZKHQDVNHGRQ
a frequency scale how closely they would monitor Homeland Security and/or some other
form of mass media for updates on security, 63 (M = 37.14) said very closely, 10 (M =
15.50) said somewhat closely, and three (M = 10.00) said not closely. A one way
ANOVA indicated significant difference between the means. Table 3 shows the results of
the one way ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significance difference between
very closely and somewhat closely (ǻ = 21.643) at the 0.05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-8
Monitor  Homeland  Security  and/or  Mass  Media  -  Case  one  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
5726.983
2
2863.492
5.073
.009
Within Groups
41208.214
73
564.496
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05

Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when
asked how closely they would monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of
mass media for updates on security, 62 (M = 38.47) responded very closely, nine (M  =
18.89) indicated somewhat closely, and five (M = 20.00) said not closely. A one way
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ANOVA did not indicate significant differences between the means [F (2,73) = 3.986, p
< .05].
Overall, results would indicate that facility managers are more likely to monitor
Homeland Security when risk is presented on a frequency scale as opposed to a
probability scale.
Case two, with risk communicated in the form of frequency, when asked how
closely they would monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass media
for updates on security, 63 (M = 36.83) said very closely, nine (M = 18.89) said
somewhat closely, and four (M = 5.00) said not closely. A one way ANOVA indicated
significant difference between the means. Table 3-1 shows the results of the one way
ANOVA. A follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference between very closely
and not closely (ǻ = 31.825) at the .05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-9
Monitor  Homeland  Security  and/or  Mass  Media  -  Case  two  Frequency  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
5849.979
2
2924.990
4.869
.010
Within Groups
43853.968
73
600.739
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05

Given the same case, but with risk communicated in the form of probability, when
asked how closely they would monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of
mass media for updates on security, 53 (M = 36.32) said very closely, 18 (M  = 18.33)
somewhat closely, and five (M = 5.00) not closely. A one way ANOVA indicated

41

significant difference between the means. Table 3-2 shows the results of the ANOVA. A
follow up Tukey HSD indicated significant difference between very closely and not
closely (ǻ = 31.321) and very closely and somewhat closely (ǻ = 17.987) at the .05 level.
________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-10
Monitor  Homeland  Security  and/or  Mass  Media  -  Case  two  Probability  
________________________________________________________________________
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Sum of
df
Mean
F
Sig
Squares
Squares
________________________________________________________________________  
Between Groups
7692.453
2
3846.226
6.931
.002
Within Groups
40507.547
73
554.898
------------________________________________________________________________________
Note. p<.05
2YHUDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVYDULHGRQERWKVFDOHVWKHUHIRUHWKHUHZDV
no difference in how risk was communicated.
Media Influence Results - Research Questions Four & Five
Section one of the survey also dealt with identifying whether media (television,
radio, internet, conference, magazines, newspaper, and word of mouth) influences a
IDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOihood of a terrorist attack (research question
four) and security preparation plans (research question five). It is felt that the portrayal of
WHUURULVPWKURXJKWKHPHGLDPD\KDYHDQHIIHFWRQRQH¶VSHUFHSWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKH
responses, 37 (48.68%) agreed the media, through news coverage, shapes their perception
of risk or threats; however, 29 (38.16%) of the subjects disagreed with that statement
whereas four (5.25%) strongly disagreed, and two (2.63%) had no opinion. When looking
at whether or not the media, through news coverage, shapes the way people perceive risk,
41 (53.95%) agreed, 31 (40.79%) strongly agreed with that statement, two (2.63%)
strongly disagreed, one (1.32%) disagreed, and one had no opinion (1.32%). Of the
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responses, 41 (53.95%) agreed the media, through news coverage, shapes the way most
professionals in their industry perceive risk or threats, 23 (30.26%) disagreed, six
(7.89%) strongly agreed, four (5.26%) had no opinion, and two (2.63%) strongly
disagreed.
In regard to security preparation, when respondents were asked whether the media
influences their security plans, 42 (55.26%) agreed it was necessary to take added
precautions to protect their facility based on the dangers that they have learned about on
the news or through other media outlets, while 18 (23.68%) disagreed, 15 (19.74%)
strongly agreed, and one (1.32%) strongly disagreed. Additionally, 36 (47.37%) agreed
that the media, through  news  coverage,  affects  the  way  sport  facility  managers  develop  
their  risk  management  policies  and  procedures,  while  29  (38.16%)  disagreed,  five  
(6.58%)  strongly  agreed,  and  four  (5.26%)  strongly  disagreed.  Finally,  when  asked  if  the  
media  has  affected  the  development  of  risk  management  policies  and  procedures  for  their  
facility,  35  (46.05%)  agreed  with  that  statement,  25  (32.89%)  disagreed,  seven  (9.21%)  
strongly  disagreed,  five  (6.58%)  had  no  opinion,  and  four  (5.26%)  strongly  agreed.    
  

Overall, the results would indicate that most facility managers are influenced by the

way the media portrays terrorism and that their changes in security preparation were
influenced by the media coverage of terrorism.
Other Results
This research examined at what point, i.e., threshold, would facility managers feel a
facility was at risk for a potential terrorist attack. Facility managers were provided risk
assessments ranging from one out of 100 or one percent to 30 out of 100 or 30% chance
of a possible terrorist attack at a basketball facility. According to the results, the threshold
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for when facility managers felt a facility was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack
occurred sooner when presenting risk on a frequency scale than a probability scale.
Facility managers indicated a facility was at high risk for a potential terrorist attack when
the security warning hit 10 out of 100 (36.84%) as opposed to 20% (36.84%) when
communicated on a probability scale. Facility managers indicated they would re-evaluate
their security preparation plans sooner when risk was communicated on a frequency scale
than probability. Facility managers indicated very likely to re-evaluate plans at one out of
100 (36.84%) as opposed to 10% (42.11%) on a probability scale. However, facility
managers did agree on when to monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of
mass media for security updates. Arena managers stated at 10 out of 100 (36.84%) or
10% (39.47%) they would very closely monitor Homeland Security and/or mass media.   
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Chapter  Five  -  Discussion  
  
Survey Response
The entire population of basketball facility managers at Division I institutions were
sent the survey. Out of 350, 76 were completed, a return rate of 22.3%. The low return
rate from facility managers may indicate that arena managers do not consider themselves
a target for a potential terrorist attack and as a result, may not feel the need to partake in
research in that area (Dunn, 2010). The sensitivity of the topic could have been another
reason facility managers did not complete the survey.
It should be noted that most (26.32%) of the facility managers who completed the
survey reside in the Northeast part of the country; this may be the result of 9/11 terrorist
attacks in New York. Facility managers who work in the Northeast may feel they are
more vulnerable to potential attacks than facility managers who work in a different part
of the country and, therefore, want to partake in research in this area.
Risk Communications
5HVXOWVRIUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQRQH ³'RHVWKHZD\LQZKLFKULVNFRPPXQLFDWLRQLV
presented (i.e., frequency vHUVXVSUREDELOLW\ LQIOXHQFHDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI
WKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDWHUURULVWDWWDFN"´ DQGUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQWKUHH ³'RHVWKHZD\LQZKLFK
risk communication is presented (i.e., frequency versus probability) influence how
closely facility PDQDJHUVPRQLWRU+RPHODQG6HFXULW\DQGRUPDVVPHGLD"´ LQFDVHRQH
did follow Slovic et al., (2000) study on risk assessment and risk communication in
which individuals perceived risk differently on a frequency scale verses a probability
scale. In this study, facility managers perceived risk greater on a frequency scale than a
probability scale. Slovic et al., (2000) attributed the different reactions to probability and
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frequency to frightening images evoked by the frequency format. In other words,
individuals envision more people dying and/or are at a greater risk when they read 10 out
of 100 as opposed to 10%. Case one placed the facility manager in Queens, NY, not far
from where the 9/11 attacks took place. Facility managers were provided a brief report of
the area which included the following: (1) an SUV parked one block away was found to
contain weapons of mass destruction, capable of killing hundreds of people; (2) the area
airport was on high alert due to a bomb exploding in the bathroom of a terminal one day
ago. The bomb had killed 60 people and injured hundreds; (3) the police chief on campus
had requested additional police presence; (4) the game was being televised live on ESPN;
and (5) the game was sold out.
Experiential thinking could have played a role in how the results turned out in case
one. Experiential thinking encodes reality in images, metaphors, and narratives which can
DIIHFWRQH¶VIHHOLQJVDQGMXGJPHQW 6ORYLF 3HWHUV $\HDUDJRSROLFHIRXQGDQ
SUV parked in Times Square that contained weapons of mass destruction. Although the
bomb failed to explode, it brought back painful memories and reminded people in the
area of the events of 9/11. Considering that most of the facility managers who completed
the survey worked in the Northeast, it is a possibility that part of their judgment in
answering the survey was influenced by the 9/11 events and the car bomb scare in Times
Square, triggering the higher frequency outcome.
In comparison, results of research questions one and two in case two did not follow
the Slovic et al., (2000) study on risk assessment and risk communication in which
individuals perceived risk differently on a frequency scale verses a probability scale as
IDFLOLW\PDQJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVYDULHGRQERWKWKHIUHTXHQF\and probability scales. This
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case placed facility managers in Los Angeles, California overseeing a basketball game at
the Pauley Pavilion. Facility managers were provided a brief report of the area which
included the following: (1) this month a rental truck carrying weapons of mass
destruction exploded next to a federal court house, located five miles from the arena. The
explosion killed 35 people and injured dozens; (2) the game will not be televised live;
DQG  LWVµ+DOORI)DPH1LJKW¶DQGVHYHUDOZHOO-known alumni as well as NBA stars will
be on hand.
Unlike the first case, this scenario took place far away from the 9/11 attacks.
Although Los Angeles is a well known city, it has never been attacked by weapons of
PDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ7KHUHIRUH6ORYLF¶Vet al., (2000) theory that frightening images and
experiential thinking stimulate the frequency format would not hold. The results
presented no biases when the facility manager assessed the risk, there were no advantages
or disadvantages for communicating risk via a frequency or probability scale.
7KHUHVXOWVRIUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQWZR ³'RHVWKHZD\LQZKLFKULVNFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
LVSUHVHQWHG LHIUHTXHQF\YHUVXVSUREDELOLW\ LQIOXHQFHVHFXULW\SUHSDUDWLRQSODQV"´ 
indicated that the way in which risk was communicated made no difference to facility
managers. The lack of training facility managers have concerning what to do to guard
against a terrorist attack at their respective facility can be attributed to the results (Dunn,
2010; Baker et al., 2007). Although the International Association of Venue Managers
provides a five day training program geared to venue safety and security and offers a Best  
Practice  Planning  Guide, most facility managers are unaware of their existence (Dunn,
2010; Baker et al., 2007). This lack of knowledge could potentially leave basketball
arenas vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
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7KHLQWHUHVWLQJILQGLQJLQWKLVFDVHIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHOLNHOLKRRG
of a potential terrorist attack occurring in the next three months did change based on the
scales (20 out of 100 and probability 10%). Research has shown that frequency should
evoke a higher rate of risk perception; however, this did not occur. This case had an
RSSRVLWHHIIHFWRQIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVZKHUHLQSURbability evoked a higher
UDWHRIULVN$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VJXWDQGRULQVWLQFWIHHOLQJWKDWWHOOVVRPHRQHVRPHWKLQJLV
wrong or right can attribute to these results.
0HGLD¶V,QIOXHQFH
Descriptive analysis indicated that most of the facility managers agreed that the
media influences their perception of the likelihood of a terrorist attack and that mass
media influences security preparation (research questions four and five). With technology
constantly advancing and the forms of mass media never ending, this result is not
VXUSULVLQJ7KHPHGLDSOD\VDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQPRVWSHRSOH¶VOLYHV 6FKOHLIHU
Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Gurwitch, Sitterle, Young, & Pfefferbaum, 2002; Ahern, Galea,
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold, & Vlahov, 2002; Schuster, Stein, Jaycox, Collins,
Marshall, Ellott, Zhou, Kanouse, Morrison, & Berry, 2001; Ofman, Mastria, & Steinberg,
1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); it shapes the way we eat, dress, purchase items, vote,
etc, and evidently influences the profession of facility management. Facility managers
must be aware of what is going on in their geographic region to better prepare their staff
as well as make changes to security plans. It is the job of the facility manager, with the
assistance of security personal, to maintain a safe environment for their patrons. It would
EHLQDQ\IDFLOLW\PDQDJHU¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWWRPRQLWRUORFDODQGUHJLRQDOPHGLDUHSRUWVWR
identify trends and major incidents before, during, and after each event they host.
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An interesting finding in this study: 55.26% of facility managers felt the media
influenced their security plans and it was necessary to take added precautions to protect
their facility based on the dangers learned on the news or through other media outlets.
Based on two previous studies, this level of influence was not always the case. When  
football  stadium  managers  were  asked  if  they  adjusted  their  security  based  on  the  
Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  threat  levels,  only  49%  said  they  did  (Baker,  
Connaughton,  Zhang,  &  Spengler,  2007).  DXQQ¶V  VWXG\RQEDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\
managers  indicated  only  33%  either  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  they  adjusted  their  
security  preparation  based  on  the  current  threat  level  set  by  the  DHS  color  threat  level.    
  

This  difference  in  media  influence  on  security  measures  could  be  the  result  of  

facility  managers  taking  media  reports  more  seriously  than  they  have  in  the  past.  Both  
Dunn  (2010)  and  Baker,  Connaughton,  Zhang,  &  Spengler,  (2007)  conducted  studies  that  
revealed  basketball  and  football  managers  feel  they  are  a  target  for  potential  terrorist  
attacks.  According  to  Johnston  and  Nedelescu  (2006),  terrorist  organizations  alternate  
their  targets  from  military  to  civilian,  leading  more  towards  business  entities;;  for  
example,  the  2008  terrorist  attacks  in  Mumbai,  India,  that  killed  more  than  160  people  
(Sweeney,  2011).  Over  a  three  day  period,  ten  terrorists  attacked  several  locations  known  
to  be  frequented  by  tourists  including:  Taj  Mahal  Palace  and  Tower,  Hotel  Oberoi,  Cafe  
Leopold,  Chhatrapati  Shivaji  Terminus,  Nariman  House,  and  Cama  Hospital.  Media  
outlets  streamed  live,  while  millions  around  the  world  watched  as  gun  fire  and  explosions  
broke  out  throughout  the  city.  The  unknown  terrorist  group  specifically  targeted  
American  and  British  civilians.  ThHDWWDFNVWHPSRUDU\VKXWGRZQ0XPELD¶VILQDQFLDO
district,  educational  institutions,  international  air  carriers,  sporting  events,  and  filming  of  
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Bollywood  movies  and  television  series.  This  attack  continued  the  trend  in  which  terrorist  
organizations  targeted  specific  businesses  in  which  innocent  civilians  frequent.  Targeting  
such  areas  leads  one  to  believe  that  any  business  in  which  civilians  frequent,  including  
entertainment  and  sporting  events  can  be  potential  targets.    
  

Another  reason  for  this  difference  could  be  that  more  facility  managers  have  

obtained  membership  to  professional  organizations,  like  the  International  Association  of  
Venue  Managers  (IAVM).  Such  orgainzations  provide  resources  to  facility  managers  
regarding  security  preparation.  For  example,  IAVM  provides  their  members  with  a  Best  
Practices  Planning  Guide,  which  incorprates  the  DHS  threat  level  into  decision  making.  
IVAM  also  provides  a  Venue  Safety  and  Security  (AVSS)  training  program  that  focuses  
on  security  planning  and  life  safety  management.  
  

Furthermore,  Osama  Bin  Laden  was  killed  in  a  raid  by  U.S.  Navy  Seals  during  the  

collection  of  data  for  this  study.  Due  to  potential  retaliation  attacks,  the  U.S.  placed  its  
embassies,  diplomatic  missions,  military  bases  around  the  world,  and  traveling  U.S.  
citizens  on  a  heightened  state  of  alert.  This  heightened  alert  could  have  influenced  the  
facility  managers  completing  this  survey.    
Other Results
This research examined at what point, i.e., threshold, (e.g. dangerousness) would a
facility manager perceive a facility at high risk for a potential terrorist attack, when they
would monitor Homeland Security and/or mass media for security updates, and reevaluate their security preparation plans. The results indicated that facility managers
perceived risk sooner on a frequency scale as opposed to a probability scales in all but
one area, monitoring of Homeland Security and/or mass media for security updates.
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These results followed Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor (2000) study where clinicians
who were givHQDQRWKHUH[SHUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIDSDWLHQW¶VULVNRIYLROHQWEHKDYLRUIUDPHG
in terms of relative frequency, subsequently labeled him as more dangerous than did
FOLQLFLDQVZKRZHUHVKRZQDVWDWLFDOO\³HTXLYDOHQW´ULVNH[SUHVVHGLQSUREDELOLW\ 6ORYLF
& Peters, 2006). In this study, facility managers perceived risk much quicker on a
frequency scale than probability scale. As mentioned before, Slovic et al., (2000)
attributed the different reactions to probability and frequency to frightening images
evoked by the frequency format.
There have been several other studies that have examined communicating judgment
on frequency and probability scales in which individuals have perceived the risk greater
on a frequency scale than probability. Such studies include: Yamagishi (1997),
individuals judged deadly diseases; Koehler and Macchi (1999), individuals judged the
OLNHOLKRRGRIDVXVSHFW¶V'1$PDWFKLQJWKHFULPHVFHQHDQG(SVWHLQ  LQGLYLGXDOV
judged the likelihood of drawing a jelly bean out of an urn.
The study left a disconcerted feeling in the mind of this researcher as the results
revealed that facility managers are influenced by the distribution of numerical response
options. It makes one wonder if we need to retrain our facility managers and/or mandate
certain types of curriculum and/or certification programs through professional
organizations.
Recommendations for Future Studies
7KHQHHGIRUIXWXUHVWXGLHVRQIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWHUURULVPDQGULVN
communication in the form of frequency and probability scales is clear. This study
IRFXVHGRQ1&$$'LYLVLRQ,EDVNHWEDOOIDFLOLW\PDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRISRVVLEOH
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terrorist attacks. However, other facility managers, including facility managers at the
professional level as well as other collegiate sports facility managers at the Division I, II,
and III should be studied. Furthermore, it might be helpful to perform a multivariate
ANOVA on the results in this study, to see if changes in the independent variables have
significant effects on the dependent variables and if there are interactions among the
dependent variables and among the independent variables. In addition, qualitative
research through interviewing facility managers in the field of security would be helpful
in understanding their thought processes when evaluating risk communications.
Conclusion
This research studied judgments and decisions based on how risk was
communicated, i.e., frequency versus probability scales. Overall, the results from this
study have shown that when communicating risk on frequency and probability scales,
different judgments will arise. It would seem individuals perceive risk greater on a
frequency scale than a probability scale. Slovic et al., (2000) attributed the different
reactions to probability and frequency to frightening images evoked by the frequency
format.
Facility managers have many decisions to make before hosting an event and while
they cannot ward off all potential negative incidents from occurring, they can reduce the
extent of damage if something were to happen. It would seem based on the results of this
study that more research needs to be completed; specifically, how facility managers
analyze risk and what goes through a facility managers mind while analyzing risk.
Perhaps risk cannot be communicated based on frequency and probability scales, but
through other forms of communication.
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Recently, the Obama administration eliminated the color-coded terrorism threat
advisory scale, introduced after 9/11 by the Bush administration. The color-coded alert
system was meant to inform U.S. citizens of the risks  for  potential  terrorist  attacks  on  
federal,  state,  and  local  authorities  and  to  U.S.  civilians. The new system, the National
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), is designed to offer a more comprehensive, detailed
alert to U.S. citizens. In addition, the PLAN system, a new text messaging alert system
will be in place for residents living in New York and Washington, D.C. later this year
(AFP, 2011).
There are no easy ways to predict a threat. Risk managers face the difficult and
ongoing task of providing the safest venue possible via continual evaluation of their risk
management plans, corresponding to changing events, governmental alerts, and
increasing information from researchers and professionals in risk communication.
Research in the area of risk communications is vital in this era of international terrorism.
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Appendix  A  
Introduction Letter to Facility Managers
April, 2011
Robyn Lubisco
University of New Mexico
Department of Health, Exercise, and Sports Sciences
Johnson Center
MSC04 2610
1 University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131-1251
Dear Facility Manager:
My name is Robyn Lubisco, I am a Ph.D candidate in Sports Administration at the
University of New Mexico. As part of my last requirement for my degree, I must
complete research (dissertation) in the field of Sports Management. As you are aware,
providing a safe arena is of the upmost importance, especially since the events of
September 11, 2001. It is my hope that this research will provide a better understanding
of how a facility manager assesses risk and risk communication.
You were selected as a participant for this study based on your professional practice and
experience. Your response to the survey will provide critical and valuable information to
our profession. It will require approximately 10 minutes of your time to fill out the survey
questionnaire.
There is no risk of harm to you. You may choose whether to participate in this study or
not. If you agree to participate, you may withdraw at any time. You may also refuse to
answer any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. Once the
questionnaire responses are received, they will not be viewed by anyone but the
researcher. Your responses and the results of this study will remain completely
confidential and private.
If you have any questions and/or concerns of this study or would like to know the results,
you may contact me directly at 732-491-6619 or rlubisco@unm.edu. You may also contact
my dissertation chair, Dr. Annie Clement 505-277-5151 or annieclement1@bellsouth.net.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Robyn Lubisco  
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APPENDIX  B.  Survey  
Section  I.  
Thank you for participating in this study. The length of time required for the completion
of this survey is about fifteen (15) minutes. Your participation in this study is completely
voluntary and the results of individual surveys will be confidential. There is no risk of
harm to you. You may withdraw from the survey at any time with no penalty to you. This
survey collects no personal identifying data. Respondents will remain completely
anonymous.
Your Demographic Information
1. What is your highest level of education?
1. High  School  Graduate  ______  
2.  Some  College  _________  
%DFKHORU¶V'HJUHHBBBBBB  
4.  Graduate  Degree  ______  
5.  Doctorate    _________  
2. How long have you worked in facility management? (Include years as an intern and
graduate assistant)
A. 0-2  years  _____  B.  3-5  years  _____  C.  6-8  years  _____  D.  9+  Years  _____  
  
3.  How long have you been in your current position?
A. 0-2  years  _____  B.  3-5  years  _____  C.  6-8  years  _____  D.  9+  Years  _____  
  
4. In what area of the country do you work?
A.  Northeast _____ B.  Midwest _____ C.  Southeast _____ D.  Southwest _____ E.  
West ___

http://excelfacilityservices.com/
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Directions: Please read the following statements and choose your answer by checking
the box next to the answer that most appropriately reflects your opinion. Please note:
Mass media is any form of communication, i.e. television, radio, internet, conferences,
magazine, & word of mouth.

1. The media, through news coverage, shapes the way people perceive risk.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

No Opinion

2. It is necessary to take added precautions to protect my facility based on dangers that I
have learned about on the news or through other media outlets.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

No Opinion

3. The media, through news coverage, shapes the way most professionals in my industry
perceive types of risk or threats.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

No Opinion

4. The media, through news coverage, affects the way sport facility managers develop
their risk management policies and procedures.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

No Opinion

5. The media, through news coverage, shapes my perception of risks or threats.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly Agree

No Opinion

6. The media has affected the development of risk management policies and procedures
for my facility.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Agree
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Strongly Agree

No Opinion

Section  II.  
Directions: You will be given eight risk assessments. Please read each risk assessment
and answer the three questions that follow. Choose your answer by checking the box next
to the answer that most appropriately reflects your opinion.

Condition #1
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  an  estimated  1%  probability  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  
the  next  month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #2
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  a  1  out  of  100  chance  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  the  next  
month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #3
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  an  estimated  5%  probability  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  
the  next  month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #4
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  an  estimated  10%  probability  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  
the  next  month.   
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #5
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  a  5  out  of  100  chance  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  the  next  
month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #6
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  a  10  out  of  100  chance  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  the  next  
month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #7
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  a  20  out  of  100  chance  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  the  next  
month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #8
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  an  estimated  20%  probability  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  
the  next  month.     
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #9
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  a  30  out  of  100  chance  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  the  next  
month.    
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Condition #10
Homeland  Security  has  issued  the  following  warnings  to  all  college  sport  facility  
managers.  There  is  an  estimated  30%  probability  of  being  attacked  by  group  XY  in  
the  next  month.     
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Would you describe this facility as being high risk, medium risk, or low risk for a
potential terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

2. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

3. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Section  III.    
Direction:  Please read this page before continuing. Please note: at anytime you may
withdraw from the survey. Definitions you will need to know.
1. What  is  meant  by  risk?    
7KHFKDQFHRILQMXU\GDPDJHRUORVVGDQJHURXVFKDQFHKD]DUG :HEVWHU¶V 
2. What  are  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)?  
³Weapons  capable  of  inflicting  massive  destruction  to  property  and/or  population,  using  
FKHPLFDOELRORJLFDORUUDGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDO´ $UP\-technology,  2010).    
3.  What  is  meant  by  frequency?  
Frequency  describes  how  often  an  event  or  set  of  circumstances  is  expected  to  occur  
based  on  previous  experience,  either  in  a  period  of  time  (e.g.,  once  per  year)  or  in  a  
number  of  trials  (e.g.,  seven  times  out  of  ten)  (Hillson,  2009 ³$IUHTXHQF\IRUPDW
presents the chance of occurrence as a proportion of discrete cases over those at risk for
DQRFFXUUHQFH´ 6FKDSLUD1DWWLQJHU 0FKRUQH\S $QH[DPSOHZRXOGEH
There is a 20 out of 100 chance a terrorist attack can occur.
4. What  is  mass  media?  
Mass media is any form of communication, i.e., television, radio, internet, conferences,
magazine, & word of mouth.
Directions: You will be asked to read two hypothetical cases involving risk assessment.
After reading each case, please answer the four questions that follow. Choose your
answer by checking the box next to the answer that most appropriately reflects your
opinion.
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Hypothetical  Case  #  1  
<RXDUHWKHIDFLOLW\PDQDJHULQFKDUJHRIVHFXULW\DWWRQLJKWV6DLQW-RKQ¶VYV5XWJHU¶V8QLYHUVLW\
0HQ¶V%DVNHWEDOO*DPH
Arena  Location - Queens, New York
Size  of  Arena - 6,008. Carnesecca  Arena  ranks  as  the  fourth-largest  indoor  arena  in  the  
Metropolitan  area,  behind  the  Meadowlands,  Madison  Square  Garden  and  Nassau  Veterans  
Memorial  Coliseum.
Size  of  Borough - 2,306,712
Terrorist-like  activity - An SUV parked one block away was found to contain weapons of mass
destruction, capable of killing hundreds of people. New York University, located approximately
13 miles/25 minutes from the Carnesecca arena, recently had to evacuate the Jerome S. Cole
Sports center due to a bomb scare. The area airports are on high alert due to a bomb exploding in
the bathroom of the American Airlines terminal one day ago. The bomb killed 60 people and
injured hundreds.
Miscellaneous  Items  - The police chief on campus has requested to have more of a police
presence at the basketball game. The game is being televised live on ESPN. The arena will be
sold out due to the rivalry that exists between these two teams. The Sports Administration Club
on campus is hosting a tailgate party that is expected to attract many students and alumni.

Please  answer  the  following  questions.    
1. In your judgment, what is the frequency (e.g., 10 out of 100) of a potential terrorist
attack occurring at this facility within the next 3 months?
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out of 100

2. Would you describe the risk at this facility to be high, medium, or low for a potential
terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

3. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

4. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Hypothetical  Case  #2  
You are a facility manDJHULQFKDUJHRIVHFXULW\DWWRGD\¶V8&/$YV6WDQIRUG0HQ¶V
basketball game.
Arena  Location - Los Angeles, CA
Size  of  Arena - Pauley Pavilion 10,337  permanent  upholstered  seats  and  retractable  
bleachers  for  2,482  spectators.
Size  of  City - 3,833,995
Terrorist-like  activity  - This month a rental truck carrying weapons of mass destruction
exploded after an individual parked it next to a federal court house, located
approximately 5 miles from your arena. The explosion killed 35 people and injured
dozens.
Miscellaneous  Items  -  The student association at UCLA are hosting a tailgate party. The
JDPHZLOOWHOHYLVHGOLYHRQ(631%RWKWHDPVDUHFXUUHQWO\XQGHIHDWHGLWVµ+DOORI)DPH
1LJKW¶DQGVHYHUDOZHOO-known alumni as well as NBA stars will be in attendance.
  
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. In your judgment, what is the frequency (e.g., 10 out of 100) of a potential terrorist
attack occurring at this facility within the next 3 months?
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out of 100

1. Would you describe the risk at this facility to be high, medium, or low for a potential
terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

3. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

4. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Please read this page before continuing. Please note: at anytime you may withdraw from
the survey. You will be asked to read over two hypothetical cases involving risk
assessment. After reading over each case, please answer the four questions that follow.
Definitions you will need to know.
1.  What  is  meant  by  risk?  
The chance of injury, damage, or loss; dangerous chance; KD]DUG :HEVWHU¶V 
2.  What  are  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)?
³Weapons  capable  of  inflicting  massive  destruction  to  property  and/or  population,  using  
FKHPLFDOELRORJLFDORUUDGLRDFWLYHPDWHULDO´ $UP\-technology,  2010).    
3.  What  is  meant  by  probability?  
A statistical  term  describing  how  likely  a  single  uncertain  event  or  set  of  circumstances  is  
WRRFFXU +LOOVRQ ³$SUREDELOLW\IRUPDWW\SLFDOO\SUHVHQWVWKHFKDQFHRI
RFFXUUHQFHDVDSHUFHQWDJH´ Schapira, Nattinger, & Mchorney, 2001, p. 464-465). An
example would be: There is a 20% likelihood that a terrorist attack can occur.
4. What  is  mass  media?  
Mass media is any form of communication, i.e. television, radio, internet, conferences,
magazine, & word of mouth.
Directions:  You will be asked to read two hypothetical cases involving risk assessment.
After reading each case, please answer the four questions that follow. Choose your
answer by checking the box next to the answer that most appropriately reflects your
opinion.
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Hypothetical  Case  #1  
<RXDUHWKHIDFLOLW\PDQDJHULQFKDUJHRIVHFXULW\DWWRQLJKWV6DLQW-RKQ¶VYV5XWJHU¶V
8QLYHUVLW\0HQ¶V%DVNHWEDOO*DPH
Arena  Location - Queens, New York
Size  of  Arena - 6,008. Carnesecca  Arena  ranks  as  the  fourth-largest  indoor  arena  in  the  
Metropolitan  area,  behind  the  Meadowlands,  Madison  Square  Garden  and  Nassau  Veterans  
Memorial  Coliseum.
Size  of  Borough - 2,306,712
Terrorist-like  activity - An SUV parked one blocks away was found to contain weapons of
mass destruction, capable of killing hundreds of people. New York University, located
approximately 13 miles/25 minutes from the Carnesecca arena, recently had to evacuate the
Jerome S. Cole Sports center due to a bomb scare. The area airports are on high alert due to a
bomb exploding in the bathroom of the American Airlines terminal one day ago. The bomb
killed 60 people and injured hundreds.
Miscellaneous  Items  - The police chief on campus has requested to have more of a police
presence at the basketball game. The game is being televised live on ESPN. The arena will be
sold out due to the rivalry that exists between these two teams. The Sports Administration
Club on campus is hosting a tailgate party that is expected to attract many students and
alumni.

Please  answer  the  following  questions.    
1. Please indicate your judgment of the probability that a terrorist attack could potentially
occur at this facility within the next 3 months?
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100%

2. Would you describe the risk at this facility to be high, medium, or low for a potential
terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

3. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

4. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely

Hypothetical  Case  #2  
<RXDUHDIDFLOLW\PDQDJHULQFKDUJHRIVHFXULW\DWWRGD\¶V8&/$YV6WDQIRUG0HQ¶V
basketball game.
Arena  Location - Los Angeles, CA
Size  of  Arena - Pauley Pavilion 10,337  permanent  upholstered  seats  and  retractable  
bleachers  for  2,482  spectators.
Size  of  City - 3,833,995
Terrorist-like  activity  - There is no terrorist activity in your city; however, this month a
rental truck carrying weapons of mass destruction exploded after an individual parked it
next to a federal court house, located approximately 5 miles from your arena. The
explosion killed 35 people and injured dozens.
Miscellaneous  Items  -  The student association at UCLA are hosting a tailgate party. The
JDPHZLOOQRWEHWHOHYLVLRQOLYHEXWRQWDSHGHOD\%RWKWHDPVDUHXQGHIHDWHGLWVµ+DOORI
)DPH1LJKW¶DQGVHYHUDOZHOO-known alumni as well as NBA stars will be in attendance.
  
Please  answer  the  following  questions:  
1. Please indicate your judgment of the probability that a terrorist attack could potentially
occur at this facility within the next 3 months?
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2. Would you describe the risk at this facility to be high, medium, or low for a potential
terrorist attack?
High Risk

Medium Risk

Low Risk

3. How closely would you monitor Homeland Security and/or some other form of mass
media for updates on security?
Not Closely

Somewhat Closely

Very Closely

4. How likely are you to re-evaluate your security preparation?
Unlikely

Somewhat Likely
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Very Likely
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